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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Time as an Independent Variable: A Tool to Drive Cost Out 
of and Efficiency Into Major Acquisition Programs 
J. David Patterson—Patterson is executive director of the National Defense Business Institute 
(NDBI) at the University of Tennessee. He is the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense, Comptroller, and served as the executive director of the DoD’s Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment study. He was special assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and 
held executive positions in the defense industry. Patterson is a retired Air Force officer with 25 years 
of service. The NDBI provides assistance and resources to both the DoD and the defense industry to 
produce services, systems, and equipment more effectively and efficiently. [dpatterson@utk.edu] 
Abstract 
With few exceptions, studies on improving the acquisition of weapon systems and services 
within the DoD observe that the process takes too long. A 2010 report of a study led by 
former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs Stephen Hadley entitled The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s 
National Security Needs in the 21st Century: The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review Independent Panel supported this point of view, asserting that no defense program 
should exceed seven years. In a September 14, 2010, memorandum, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics called for the DoD acquisition community 
to “set shorter program timelines and manage to them.” But what is the right timeline for a 
given defense program? The author offers a methodology for making that determination 
through a process using time as an independent variable (TAIV™)1 in a way similar to using 
cost as an independent variable (CAIV). Using TAIV™ establishes a credible way of 
reconciling cost, capability, and the time required to field a needed capability. 
Introduction 
Although the work done in assessing the value of using time as an independent 
variable (TAIV™) is not a panacea, there are clearly acquisition programs where cost and 
performance should vary with program management conditions that recommend accepting 
more performance at an increase in cost. What the National Defense Business Institute 
(NDBI) has found is that assessing a capability relative to the time necessary to achieve that 
capability is a useful effort. TAIV™ can be a valuable tool to that end. 
From the end of the Korean War to the present, the length of time required to field a 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) has persistently grown as a common practice. 
In their assessment Streamlining DoD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule With Complexity, 
James Rothenflue and Marsh Kwolek (2010) put it more bluntly: 
Since at least the late 1960s, the Department of Defense has been trapped in 
an escalating cycle of cost overruns and schedule delays on large acquisition 
programs. In particular, state-of-the-art aircraft programs have ballooned from 
one to five year sprints during and immediately after World War II to the 25-
year marathons of the present day. 
With the ever-increasing length of time taken to field weapon systems, total program costs 
have risen as well. 
                                                
1TAIV™ is an acronym trademarked by Monitor Government Venture Service, LLC, during the course 
of their research and analysis of the use of time as an independent variable, sponsored by the Office 
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
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Analysis over time shows that acquisition programs generally grow about 50% in 
cost (Younossi et al., 2006), and of course larger defense programs have higher stakes 
owing to the sums of money involved compared with programs managed by other federal 
agencies. Programs with longer timeframes for engineering, manufacturing, and 
development also experience greater cost growth (Younossi et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
almost all acquisition strategies lack the analysis as to what time does, as an independent 
variable, to the trade space defined by the minimum and optimum performance and cost. 
Two recent commentaries on the crucial nature of time as a key element in acquiring 
weapons and military equipment come from different quarters, but they agree on the way 
forward. In a 2010 study, two former senior government officials argued that study, which 
was led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs Stephen Hadley entitled The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 
America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century: The Final Report of the Quadrennial 
Defense Review Independent Panel. Hadley and Perry (2010) were quite clear in their 
recommendation, explaining,  
Permitting delivery times longer than a reasonably achievable standard is 
counterproductive to both the demand for responsiveness to current needs 
and tomorrow‘s challenges. For major programs for future forces, useful 
increments of military capability should be defined as what can be delivered 
within 5 to 7 years with no more than moderate risk. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Ashton 
Carter, also addressed the issue of time in a 2010 memorandum to acquisition professionals 
titled Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending. As one of his 23 principal actions “to improve efficiency” in the DoD 
acquisition efforts, Dr. Carter mandated, “Set shorter program timelines and manage to 
them.” 
The significance of time to more efficient acquisition of military weapons and 
equipment is not new. The Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2004 
asked the Monitor Group (Monitor Company Group LP, 2003) to look at the value of 
establishing time as a boundary condition or driver in determining the desired timeframe 
between Milestone B and initial operating capability. Time should be considered an 
independent variable (TAIV™), especially when it is critical to field a capability on a specific 
point in the future to have a positive impact on a threat or in the course of ongoing combat. 
Because there is little direct research on TAIV™ specifically, the Monitor Group work done 
for the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and subsequent analyses completed for 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2006) 
establishes most of the foundational thinking on using time to establish time as a structured 
way to determine the limits or boundaries of acquisition programs. However, it is equally 
important that there be a reliable, valid process for the DoD to “evaluate, acquire and 
deploy” the most current and effective technology for “long-term performance and mission 
accomplishment” (Sherman & Rhoades, 2010). 
Unfortunately, the idea did not gain traction in 2004, for two related reasons. Among 
the acquisition community, there is a pervasive belief that a capability is selected to address 
a requirement that then takes as long as it takes. Such an attitude carries with it no 
discipline or structure and allows for program success to be dependent on yet-to-be-realized 
inventions and even miracles. That lack of discipline creates a work environment governed 
by manufactured job security rather than efficiency. By allowing programs to be temporally 
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indeterminate, government employees and contractors have no incentive to bring projects to 
closure, allowing programs to drag out for longer periods of time.  
Times have changed, and the pressure is intense to reduce the time it takes to put 
weapon systems and equipment in the field and simultaneously reduce the costs that attend 
prolonged and stretched programs. The time is opportune for applying the TAIV™ tool for 
new acquisition programs, as well as to block upgrades to existing programs. 
Applying TAIV™ 
How should TAIV™ work in a practical sense? When the Monitor Group in 2004 
attempted to use time to drive discipline and structure into the acquisition system, the idea 
was to use TAIV™ to enable the DoD’s transformation initiatives as a supporting acquisition 
framework. There was sense of urgency in getting needed weapon systems and equipment 
to the warfighters in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  
If TAIV™ is to be used and applied to the full program life-cycle, then the TAIV™ 
analysis must start early in the acquisition program concept development and acquisition 
process. TAIV™ must be an essential part of the acquisition strategy, solicitation process, 
and contract development activities.  
The DoD generally pursues one of three approaches when acquiring a weapon 
system or piece of equipment: single step to full capability, incremental development, or 
spiral development. Incremental and spiral development are grouped under the category of 
evolutionary acquisition strategy (DoD, 2011). The acquisition approach must consider what 
the desired end state of the program is to be and determine the appropriateness TAIV™. 
Single-step to full capability can apply TAIV™ successfully when the end-state requirements 
are known and can be used to set program length, program milestones, and incentivize 
compliance. Additionally, the technology must be mature. Commodity parts and immediately 
available capability would fit the single-step to full-capability category. 
Applying TAIV™ to an incremental development approach fits when the end-state 
requirements are understood and when multiple development cycles are anticipated. Again, 
mature technologies are required, as well as threats that can be addressed with minimum 
rather than assured operating capability. TAIV™ would be used to set the increment 
duration and would be useful as an incentive to drive compliance. 
The last acquisition approach, spiral development, is most appropriate when multiple 
development cycles are anticipated and the acquisition program will produce interim 
outputs. End-state requirements may not be certain. Programs in this category may have 
some level of exploratory development, but with mature technology. To address threats 
effectively, sufficient capability is required sooner, rather than assured or objective 
performance capability later. 
Generally, when time is the subject of research, it is used in terms of reducing cycle 
time for acquiring systems and equipment, or in other words, looking at the time from 
program start to delivery from the top down. The intent is to simply compress or streamline 
the acquisition process and drive time out with “levers for reducing cycle time” (Sherman & 
Rhoades, 2010). The traditional approach emphasizes ways to reduce time spent on 
activities or events that are in progress. TAIV™ takes an alternative approach by 
establishing, from the outset, what performance or capability is possible based on the time-
defined construct, or when the weapon system or equipment must be in the field. Once the 
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The green line in Figure 1 represents the sequence of technology maturation over 
time. The TAIV™ process looks at the maturity and relevance of a necessary technology 
that provides a warfighting capability starting at the beginning of the technology maturation 
line (point 1). The distance between points 1 and 2 represents the time necessary to 
develop, adapt, or exploit a maturing technology and turn it into a capability. Point 2 is the 
best time-to-field versus capability increase. It is at this point that the maximum amount of 
capability for the technology available is realized. The timeframe represented by point 3 
allows for fielding and follow-on production of a capability. Taking additional time to develop 
a particular technology will not provide marginally greater capability until point 4, when there 
is another technology breakthrough. As demonstrated, TAIV™ puts the emphasis on fielding 
capability when the technology supporting the capability has its greatest value. That value is 
defined by the lack of an equal alternative technology that meets the time-defined capability. 
 
 Time as an Independent Variable (TAIV™) for Fielding Capability 
Note. Identifying the “Critical Time vs. Capability Point” where extending the time does not achieve a 
marginally greater degree of capability is the analytic value of TAIV™. 
Coincidentally, the technologies that underpin the capabilities that might be needed 
in the future continue to mature. Over time, significant breakthroughs occur, increasing the 
potential for ever-greater capability, but only after a capability has been fielded. When 
additional time spent on development of technology no longer increases the level of 
capability, that is the critical time to field a capability. The existing technology should be 
exploited from that point until there is another technology breakthrough or dramatic 
technology increase. 
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Should the need for a capability be more urgent because of a more near-term threat, 
the level of technology may have to be less capable. In such a case, an appropriate strategy 
would be single-step to full capability. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology provides 
a solution with little or no need for integration or development time and would aid in putting a 
capability in the field in the least amount of time. The concept of using time to drive the level 
of technology that defines a capability can be used to assess the appropriate capability and 
performance trades. 
The challenge for the acquisition community is twofold. First, the point in time must 
be established at which a weapon system should be fielded. Second, the available COTS 
capability must be determined in terms of what can be most easily developed. As Figure 1 
shows, getting greater capability to the field earlier relies on exploiting what is available that 
requires little or no development. The ideal condition achieves operational capability at the 
point where additional time does not gain appreciably greater capability—the critical time 
versus capability point, or the knee in the TAIV™ curve. 
The crux of the TAIV™ tool’s value comes from its ability to reveal the amount of 
time necessary to meet a required fielding date with the most capability. 
As depicted in Figure 1, the TAIV™ process satisfies all three of the acquisition 
approaches described previously. Single-step to full capability can be achieved when the 
end-state requirements are certain; incremental development using TAIV™ when both end-
state requirements and multiple development cycles are criteria; and a spiral development 
approach would benefit from TAIV™ when multiple development cycles and interim outputs 
are anticipated. 
Figure 2 represents how threshold and objective performance parameters can frame 
the trade space for achieving the target delivery of a capability. Again, time establishes the 
boundaries. 
 
 TAIV™ Reveals Trade Space Dimension 
(adapted from 2004 Monitor Group briefing) 
Note. TAIV™ provides a means of identifying the best value performance solution to field an effective 
capability at a target delivery time. 
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Establishing capability and the desired performance with objective performance 
value and minimum acceptable or threshold performance value frame the capability 
performance necessary to meet a requirement and address a threat. The trade space 
becomes the time between the earliest that the threshold performance can be met and the 
latest delivery date before the risk of significant damage. Again, the target delivery date is 
defined as that point in time where the most capability or performance can be achieved, 
after which continued pursuit of “better” performance has little or no increase in capability 
before the latest delivery.  
The target delivery date is also the point in the future when the best capability over 
time can be achieved at the best value.  
It is a reasonable assumption that acquisition programs, guided by earliest and latest 
acceptable time-to-field, possess a credible understanding of the threat to be addressed by 
the capability. Here again, having TAIV™ as a tool lends credibility to the argument 
advocating for a particular capability being fielded at a particular point in future. 
TAIV™ Integrates Threat Assessment, Time-to-Field With Available Technology 
TAIV™ is useful in helping determine the greatest capability over the least amount of 
time, but some forcing function must be present to actually define the “least amount of time.” 
At minimum there must be some understanding of the driving requirement that 
addresses an understood national security threat. Then “the least amount of time” becomes 
the time to field the weapon systems or piece of equipment.  
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship among time, capability, and technology progress 
when compared to the window of understanding represented by the threat a potential 
enemy. Over time, there is less fidelity in the understanding of threat in terms of the lower 
and upper limits of the capability necessary to meet a requirement to address the threat. 
The clearest and most credible understanding of the threat has the most fidelity in the near 
term. Understanding of the threat declines as the assessment of that threat is pushed further 
into the future. 
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 Capability Over Time Relative to Level of Threat Understanding 
(adapted from 2004 Monitor Group briefing) 
Note. As planners attempt to assess the threat to national security, there is less fidelity and accuracy 
possible the further into the future the assessment is made. 
Additionally, as Figure 3 suggests, using TAIV™, it is more likely that the capability 
possible in the near term (and more in line with the critical time-to-field) will be more 
appropriate to meeting the requirement to address a threat.  
When TAIV™ is applied to the development of an acquisition program, the 
importance of time in developing and defining the technology, as well as its design and 
production, is more dominant in the analysis of cost, schedule, and achieving the desired 
performance. Time-defined in this instance, however, is not synonymous with schedule.  
Though a 2009 GAO report points out that a DAPA report recommends that 
schedule be a key performance parameter (KPP), this paper looks at the time between the 
beginning of a program and the point at which a weapon system is operational as a time-
defined period. By that definition, the specific length of time, and not schedule, is a KPP.  
Schedule is the sequential distribution of program events when, on completion, they 
have a timeframe associated with them. We measure schedule with milestones 
accomplished. TAIV™, on the other hand, is the analytic construct that identifies which 
performance capabilities are important and must be achieved, and conversely, which are of 
marginal value when considering the time from development to incorporation into the 
weapon system to fielding to consideration for future block upgrades. The time-defined 
period is established with the results of the TAIV™ analysis.  
Various recommendations exist for the timeframe for development and fielding: 
Hadley and Perry (2010) suggested five years for fighter type aircraft and eight years for 
ships, and five to seven years for all programs; in a DAPA report, Kadish (2006) 
recommended “nominally no more than six years for major platforms from Milestone A” to 
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fielding. Without a way to appropriately evaluate time, acquisition programs will continue to 
take “as long as they take.” 
Although a 2009 GAO report points out that the DAPA report (Kadish, 2006) 
recommended that schedule be a KPP, this paper looks at the time between the beginning 
of a program and the point at which a weapon system is operational as a time-defined 
period and that specific length of time be a key performance parameter, not schedule.  
The reason for distinguishing between time and schedule is to give precedence to 
the time-to-field as a weapon system or piece of equipment that should take precedence 
over a particular sequence of program events or activities. The integrated master schedule 
(IMS) can be modified during the course of program duration without doing violence to an 
established critical time to field the weapon system or piece of equipment. Establishing a 
program schedule as a KPP would suggest that to modify the schedule while not changing 
cost and performance or the time-to-field would constitute a failure to meet a KPP, but that 
would not necessarily hold true. Making schedule a KPP simply adds a level of complexity to 
the concept of TAIV™ without corresponding value. 
Urgency for fielding a particular desired capability, then, has a context that can be 
used to describe what needs to be fielded or deployed and when. Again, Kadish (2006) 
fortified this line of thinking, saying, “Once the time-to-need and the current technology risk 
level are determined the program should be time-constrained.”  
The TAIV™ curve conjures the “cost as an independent variable” curve owing to the 
analogous relationship that results from the adage “time is money.” But there is a clear 
distinction: cost may vary with time, but not directly. Many variables that include quantity and 
quality determine cost, but time is immutable. Just as, at a certain point, increasing dollars 
spent on a program will not produce a corresponding increase in capability, increasing time 
spent will also not produce a corresponding and direct increase in capability. Technology 
and innovation must come into play. Rene Cordero made this point in a 1991 discussion of 
“managing speed” in getting products to market to avoid obsolescence: “Finally, the natural 
limits of the technology are reached and only small improvements of the product are 
possible.” That point in Figure 1 is the best time-to-field versus capability point. 
Similar to a time-to-market requirement, the unified command’s assessment of when 
a capability must be fielded becomes a crucial factor in evaluating the amount of time to 
devote to fielding a new weapons program (see Figure 4). Timing plays a crucial role when 
introducing a new product and maximizing market share; similarly, weapons must be in the 
hands of warfighters at the optimum moment on the battlefield. 
 
 Market Pressures Analogous to Meeting National Security Threats 
Note. As the competitive environment for commercial goods and services drives the necessary time-
to-market to have a market edge, the understanding and certainty of the emergence of a threat to 
national security drives the required time-to-field weapon systems and military equipment. 
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Just as there is an optimum time for a new product to be introduced in order to 
capture the most market share, there must be some idea of when a weapon must in the 
hands of the warfighters to achieve the desired effect on the battlefield. The time-to-market 
drives new product development in the same way that battlefield requirements to address a 
threat drive weapons acquisition programs. Consequently, the time-to-market demand will 
be a surrogate for the time-to-field requirement for weapon systems. 
For the purpose of this paper, the competitive market pressures driving critical time-
to-market decisions are analogues to identifying military threats that drive the critical time-to-
field. Competitive pressures in business have caused product life cycles to compress, and 
subsequently, companies have taken measures to shorten their development cycles, 
thereby getting products to market faster (Griffin, 1993). Getting to the fight with the right 
equipment in time to make a difference against the threat is a DoD priority.  
Value of TAIV™ Throughout Acquisition Program  
When TAIV™ is applied, there are several benefits that result. The obvious 
advantage is that an effective capability is fielded sooner and at less cost to the government. 
The capability may be minimally sufficient, but it is sufficient. Additionally, TAIV™ has the 
potential to modify behaviors that have the potential to be costly, disrupt schedule, and 
threaten system performance. Figure 5 lists some of the behaviors that TAIV™ can 
influence positively.  
When the duration of an acquisition program is constrained by specific timeframes 
with the threat of cancellation for exceeding those limits, events like milestones and reviews 
will be viewed with greater significance. Developmental engineering, systems engineering, 
and sustaining engineering will approach engineering tasks constrained by time as 
engineering challenges to be met as they would any other engineering tasks. To establish 
the importance of TAIV™ as a legitimate and critical program management tool, DoD 
acquisition management leadership should conclude that mandating a policy that threatens 
program cancellation for missing time-defined milestones is necessary for establishing and 
maintaining program internal control. 
 
 TAIV™ Can Improve Results Tied to Acquisition Management Behaviors 
Note. When acquisition program duration has no time constraints, unintended and negative program 
management behaviors result. TAIV™ helps to establish constraints of undesired behaviors. 
Programs so often fall prey to a misplaced sense of optimism by program managers 
prone to believe that success is inevitable, despite evidence to the contrary. The constant 
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imposition of time constraints reduces that inclination toward optimism. An equally insidious 
and destructive behavior that grows with the government’s optimism is the contractor’s 
desire to please the customer, which leads to over-promising. The result, according to 
Kadish (2006), was that “the culture of the Department [of Defense] is to strive initially for the 
100 percent solution in the first article delivered to the field.” Kadish (2006) went on to say, 
“Further, the ‘Conspiracy of Hope’ causes the Department to consistently underestimate 
what it would cost to get the 100 percent solution. Therefore, products take tens of years to 
deliver and cost far more than originally estimated.” 
The test and evaluation community must be disciplined by the same time constraints 
as the rest of the program management. That means the Test and Evaluation Master Plan is 
constrained and managed to operate within the program time limits. With a mature 
technology necessary for TAIV™ to be appropriate, the challenges of the test community 
will be correspondingly reduced to live within the TAIV™-established timeframe. 
Time constraints will by design lead to shorter time cycles, and with those shorter 
time cycles the tendency to “future-proof” the weapon system or equipment. Consequently, 
over-designing will be discouraged, and the temptation to try and anticipate a future design 
requirement will be less likely. 
Lastly, one of the most disruptive and intrusive influences comes from external 
sources. Whether it is Congress, agencies in the executive branch, or the grass roots 
activities of other suppliers, with limited time for program execution comes limited time for 
these external actors to influence the program execution, causing delays, increased cost, 
and potential reduced program performance. 
There is a value to TAIV™ that is not immediately apparent; but when evaluating the 
challenges of developing an acquisition strategy that drives desired contractor behaviors, it 
should be considered. As part of an in-depth look at “Evaluating MDAP [Major Defense 
Acquisition Program] Contractor Incentives,” a research study conducted by the NDBI for the 
Director, Performance Assessment, and Root Cause Analysis Directorate, the NDBI found 
that for contractor incentives to be effective, they had to be “focused, clear and specific, 
measurable and achievable as well as motivating.” An analysis of TAIV™ in this context is 
revealing. 
Figure 6 represents a comparison between total acquisition program cost on the y 
axis and program duration (time) on the x axis. As time or program duration increases, so 
does the total cost of the program. From Figure 2, the goal or objective time is plotted 
against the target delivery time and the threshold time to field. In this case, the threshold 
becomes the longest program duration after which the rise in cost (maximum cost) makes 
the program of “questionable value to continue.” Ideally, the target cost (best value) and 
target delivery or fielding date are synchronized, once TAIV™ is exercised. 
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 TAIV™ and Incentives Affecting Contractor Behavior 
(adapted from 2004 Monitor Group briefing) 
Note. TAIV™ can be used in trade studies that reveal where to offer incentives to prompt contractor 
behavior that increases value to the government. Larger incentives could be considered to move 
program delivery into the “Additional Delivery” range for early delivery. 
The contractor would be incentivized to strive to perform in the green shaded area. 
This is the area where the contractor can work to lower program cost by delivering a quality 
product earlier. The lowering of the program cost is achieved by reducing the time to deliver 
the weapon system to the field. 
Larger incentives can be achieved by reducing the time to deliver into the “additional 
incentive range.” Using TAIV™ creates the trade space to fulfill the criteria for an incentive 
to be effective. The incentive is focused on the performance parameter of fielding the 
weapon system sooner than the target delivery time and at lower cost as a result.  
The incentive is clear and specific since establishing a time-defined target delivery 
point in the duration of the program execution. The contractor meets the target delivery 
point, achieves an earlier delivery, or misses the delivery target. Contract terms and 
conditions can be crafted to provide a penalty for missing the target delivery as a 
disincentive. 
TAIV™ allows for the criteria for incentives to be measurable and achievable 
because, again, the program deliverables either are early, meet the target date, or are late. 
The analysis that accompanies the TAIV™ analysis will take into consideration the level of 
technology maturity in determining the target delivery. 
The incentive must be motivating. If the previous three criteria are met, creating an 
incentive with a magnitude of value to the contractor becomes a matter of negotiation. The 
terms and conditions of the contract establish the value of the incentive, but with TAIV™ 
there is much less ambiguity around establishing the incentive value. 
Conclusion 
With the emphasis on greater efficiency in acquiring weapon systems and 
equipment, better buying power and the more timely fielding of weapons can benefit from a 
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more disciplined and structured approach to the process. Eliminating unproductive 
processes and bureaucracy by reducing “cycle times while ensuring sound investment 
decisions” (Kendall, 2012) would benefit from implanting TAIV™ in some form or fashion.  
Budget pressures are more intense now than they have been in nearly five decades. 
Inefficient use of scarce resources simply cannot be normal order. TAIV™ provides a 
disciplined and structured process for achieving the most capability and best-value cost in 
the least amount of time to be effective. TAIV™ eschews the one-size-fits-all downside of 
other approaches to reconcile threat, time-to-field, and cost. Rather, TAIV™ is self-tailoring 
to prompt an appreciation of how using time to establish boundaries can drive efficient 
acquisition program execution. 
The historical record of acquisition reform reports and recommendations is almost 
unanimous in its view that, as Kadish (2006) put it, “The acquisition process is slow, overly 
complex and incompatible with meeting the needs of multiple, competing, departmental 
demands, in a diverse marketplace.” TAIV™ has the potential to expedite the process to 
field the best value defense product with a level of complexity consistent with the 
requirement to meet the understood threat. The resulting fielded capability will meet the 
demands of the only customer of importance—the warfighter.  
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